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In our endeavour to understand reality we are somewhat like a man
trying to understand the mechanism of a closed watch. He sees
the face and the moving hands, even hears its ticking, but he
has no way of opening the case. —Albert Einstein and
Leopold Infeld, The Evolution of Physics (1938)
In everyday life, we generally suppose that conscious mental lives are relatively rare
occurrences in nature—enjoyed by humans and select species of animals—especially when
reflecting on the vast scale of the cosmos and its history. By all appearances, this natural
conviction receives enormous support from the picture of the natural world provided by
physics, astronomy, chemistry, biology, geology, and other branches of the physical sciences.
In general outline, this scientific picture characterizes consciousness as a relatively recent
product of the long course of the earth’s natural and evolutionary history whose emergence
is intimately linked, in some fashion, to the highly complex functioning of the brains and
central nervous systems of certain sophisticated biological organisms residing at or near the
planet’s surface. Against this background, philosophical and empirical questions about the
distribution of minded beings in nature typically concern when and where consciousness
and thought first came onto the scene and which highly evolved biological organisms do, in
fact, enjoy conscious mental lives. In a more speculative frame of mind, we might wonder
whether computers, robots, or other inorganic systems are, in principle, capable of genuine
thought and/or experience (see the “The Computational Theory of Mind” and “The
Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence” chapters elsewhere in this volume). Scientifically
informed common sense usually recoils, however, from the thought that consciousness
reaches, to any great extent, farther into the natural world.
Some have wondered whether this intuitive resistance is warranted. There is a long and
distinguished history of philosophers, scientists, theologians, and environmentalists, among
others, who have maintained that conscious minds, or the primordial elements that make
them up, are far more pervasive and deeply rooted aspects of reality.
One might start down this path through the biological sciences. There is a growing
body of neurological, behavioral, and morphological evidence that (though it is still
controversial and incomplete) suggests that consciousness is a trait shared by all mammals.
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There is also increasing evidence of the presence of consciousness, with progressively less
certainty, in birds, reptiles, mollusks, fish, and perhaps even crustaceans, insects, and
spiders. Some biologists have gone so far as to propose the likelihood of primitive
consciousness in even the simplest animals—perhaps even single-celled organisms (Margulis
2001; Ginsburg and Jablonka 2007). In fact, a few plant biologists have even argued for
plant consciousness on the grounds that plants have multimodal sensitivity to their
environments, process and store information, send chemical signals to one another, and
react in flexible, goal-directed ways (Nagel 1997; Chamovitz 2012). If these surprising
claims are true, consciousness is a far more common trait within the biological domain than
we ordinarily suppose (see the “Animal Minds” chapter in this volume).
Others have suggested that it is likely that consciousness extends far beyond the plant
and animal kingdoms. John Muir (1838–1914), one of America’s most famous
conservationists and the founder of the Sierra Club, took seriously the possibility that
consciousness is infused throughout the natural world. In his 1916 classic A Thousand-Mile
Walk to the Gulf, he mused, “Plants are credited with but dim and uncertain sensation, and
minerals with positively none at all. But why may not even a mineral arrangement of matter
be endowed with sensation of a kind that we in our blind exclusive perfection can have no
manner of communication?” (140). Though few thinkers follow Muir in attributing
consciousness to medium-sized natural phenomena such as sticks, stones, and rivers, a
number of prominent physicists have endorsed views according to which mentality is a
ubiquitous feature of the cosmos at the smallest and/or grandest scale. In his 1928 The
Nature of the Physical World, the eminent British physicist, astronomer, and mathematician
Sir Arthur Eddington (1882–1944) pronounced the likelihood that “the stuff of the world is
mind-stuff,” which is “something more general than our individual conscious minds; but we
may think of its nature as not altogether foreign to the feelings in our consciousness”
([1928] 2012, 270). One can reasonably interpret Eddington as here endorsing a version of
the view that some (and perhaps all) fundamental physical entities, such as quarks, photons,
bosons, and so on, are conscious in an attenuated sense.
This chapter considers and assesses three different philosophical views that share the
belief that conscious minds, or their fundamental ingredients, are widely distributed
throughout the natural world in a manner that in some sense eludes the explanatory reach of
the physical sciences. The first is panpsychism, which is the doctrine that mind is a
fundamental and pervasive feature of the universe. The second is panprotopsychism, which is
the doctrine that fundamental physical entities, while not themselves minded, have special
features that give rise to conscious minds when they are arranged into a sufficiently complex
physical system. The third is neutral monism, which is the doctrine that both minds and
physical entities are constructed from more basic elements of reality that are in themselves
neither mental nor physical. While each of these views is likely to sound pretty strange at
first, there are reasonable grounds for taking all three seriously.
This chapter focuses primarily on how panpsychism, panprotopsychism, and neutral
monism figure into ongoing debates in the philosophy of mind. It begins by briefly
considering why there has been increasing interest in exploring alternatives to mainstream
dualism, functionalism, and physicalism (see the “Dualism,” “Functionalism,” and
“Physicalism” chapters in this volume). The “Breathing Fire into the Equations” section
later in this chapter explains how philosophical issues about the nature of physical theories
might clear unexpected paths for finding a place in nature for consciousness. “Mind-Dust”
examines some of the motivations for adopting panpsychism and highlights its main
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challenges. The sections “The Unknown Alchemy of Consciousness” and “Neutral Stuff”
do the same for panprotopsychism and neutral monism, respectively. This chapter
concludes by taking stock of the contributions, if any, these three views make toward the
philosophical understanding of the mind and its place in the world.
WHAT WE’VE GOT HERE IS A FAILURE TO INTEGRATE
The core problem in the philosophy of mind, both currently and historically, is the problem
of integration. Here is the problem in a nutshell. On one hand, we have an everyday
conception of what conscious minds are like based largely on how ours are presented to us in
experience together with a hodgepodge of (sometimes conflicting) elements from such
sources as folk theory, popular psychology, religion, and cultural tradition. On the other
hand, we have a scientific conception of what brains and other physical phenomena are like,
which comes from neuroscience, biology, chemistry, physics, astronomy, and the rest of the
natural sciences. The fundamental question is whether we can reconcile these two
conceptions of reality and, if not, how we are to revise one or both of them so as to end up
with the best overall picture of how everything hangs together. When posed in its most
common form, the question is whether we can find a place for conscious minds, as we
ordinarily conceive of them, within the scientific picture of physical reality or whether they
are best seen as something above and beyond the physical aspects of reality.
The landscape in the philosophy of mind is largely divided between those who think
that conscious minds can, in principle, be fully integrated into the explanatory framework of
the physical sciences (without any radical departure from their current form) and those who
think they cannot.
THE CASE FOR INTEGRATION
Those optimistic about the prospect of integration often point to the immense progress of
the physical sciences toward explaining a myriad of once-mysterious phenomena—
including the origin and history of the cosmos, the fundamental particles and forces that
account for its workings and complexity, and the nature of life and reproduction. They also
point to the rapid advances the biological and cognitive sciences are making in our
understanding of the structure and functioning (both normal and abnormal) of human and
animal brains. More controversially, some would contend that we are already designing
artificial systems with varying degrees of (goal-specific) intelligence and that we will likely be
able to engineer humanlike artificial intelligence at some point in the future. In any case,
many philosophers see no compelling reason for thinking that our minds alone will elude
the relentless march of the physical sciences. What is more, Occam’s razor—the scientific
principle that entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity—cuts against the idea that
our minds are something above and beyond the physical aspects of reality.
There are also causal considerations that tell in favor of such integration (see the
“Mental Causation” chapter in this volume). From the side of reflective common sense, we
have overwhelming reason to think that conscious mental phenomena are causally
efficacious; they have some physical occurrences as causes and other physical occurrences as
effects. From the side of scientific theory, we have good reason to think that physical reality
is a causally closed system; if a physical occurrence has a cause, then that cause is itself a
physical occurrence. When these two theses are combined with the quite plausible
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assumption that there is no systematic causal redundancy in the workings of the world, we
are led straightforwardly to the conclusion that conscious mental phenomena just are a kind
of physical occurrence. This line of reasoning leaves open the question of whether minds are
identical with neurobiological processes in brains, representational or computational features
of complex physical systems, or something whose features extend into the body or external
physical environment, among other possibilities (see the “Physicalism,” “The Computa-
tional Theory of Mind,” and “Embedded, Embodied, Extended, and Enactive Cognition”
chapters in this volume). The nature of numerical identity, however, precludes the
possibility that the physical domain lacks features that conscious experience has, and vice
versa. Thus, we have good reason to think that minds can be integrated into our scientific
picture of the physical universe.
THE CASE AGAINST INTEGRATION
On the other hand, many find it hard to see how our conscious mental lives could be part of
physical reality. In particular, they are skeptical that anything physical, given what we know
about physical phenomena, could exhibit the subjective and qualitative aspects our
conscious mental lives seem to enjoy (see the “Consciousness” chapter in this volume). In
claiming that our conscious mental lives are subjective, philosophers typically mean that they
are tied to our first-person perspective on the world and that our knowledge of them is
different in some significant way from our knowledge of other things, including the minds
of anyone else. In saying that they have qualitative aspects, philosophers are pointing to the
fact that there is something it is like, experientially speaking, for us to undergo conscious
mental episodes of various kinds (see the “Consciousness” chapter). For instance, there is
often something it is like, experientially speaking, for us to feel pleasure or pain, to feel
hunger or thirst, to have various kinds of sensory experiences, to imagine or desire things,
and arguably to think about something (see the “Cognitive Phenomenology” chapter). The
problem is that such subjectivity and qualitativity are seemingly absent from the objective
picture of physical reality provided by the sciences.
Worries about integrating such features into the explanatory framework of the physical
sciences have been sharpened by a number of well-known (and hotly contested)
philosophical arguments. These arguments aim to show that our conscious mental lives
merely happen to accompany neurophysiological processes in our brains. More specifically,
they aim to show that there is no essential link between the biological makeup or
functioning of our brains and the subjective and qualitative aspects of conscious mental
episodes. For instance, many philosophers argue that no amount of physical information
about a sentient creature’s biology, history, functioning, or relations to its environment can
by itself provide us with knowledge of the character of its experiential life. Many
philosophers also maintain that we can clearly and coherently imagine (1) beings physically
and functionally just like us in indistinguishable environments whose conscious mental lives
differ qualitatively from ours (perhaps lacking them altogether) and/or (2) beings with
conscious mental lives just like ours who radically differ from us in the relevant physical and
functional respects (perhaps lacking bodies altogether). Such considerations provide weight
to the view that conscious mental lives are something over and above the neurophysiological
processes and broader physical conditions with which they are systematically correlated.
Hence, when it comes to the question of whether conscious minds can be integrated
into the scientific picture of physical reality, many feel that we are confronted with
something like an impasse. On one hand, there are forceful arguments for the conclusion
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that conscious mental episodes are wholly physical in nature. On the other hand, there are
forceful arguments that suggest that they have features that outstrip the explanatory reach of
the physical sciences (and so perhaps are not physical after all). Unsurprisingly, most
philosophers respond by trying to show that one or the other set of arguments is, all things
considered, more compelling than its alternative. Perhaps they are right to do so. Others
have responded by reexamining the relationship between the physical sciences and the
natural world they describe with the hope that doing so will be more philosophically
profitable.
BREATHING FIRE INTO THE EQUATIONS
It is natural to view scientific theories, when they are complete and true, as capable of
providing an exhaustive characterization of some aspect of the natural world. If, for instance,
physics were to have a fully worked-out, complete scientific theory of electrons, bosons, or
another fundamental physical particle, we would expect that a full understanding of this
theory would yield a full understanding of the nature of the relevant particle—and similarly
with other physical phenomena, such as mass, electromagnetism, gravity, dark matter, and
so on. In this view, if the physical sciences were to achieve the ideal of providing a
comprehensive Theory of Everything, then we could, at least in principle, use it to
understand fully any physical aspect of the cosmos whatsoever. So when we are confronted
with arguments that (taken at face value) suggest that conscious mental lives possess features
that resist integration into the explanatory framework of the physical sciences, it is easy to
draw the conclusion that these features must be nonphysical aspects of reality.
However, a number of philosophers and scientists accept the view that physical
theories, even when complete and accurate, characterize the natural world in a remarkably
limited fashion. In particular, they endorse a view popularized by the eminent British
philosopher, logician, and social activist Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) according to which
physical theories ultimately describe the universe abstractly and (almost) wholly in terms of
its structure and how its structure changes over time. Put simply, they maintain that
physical theories tell us only which things there are in the universe (in the sense that we have
names for classifying them), when and where they are located in space and time, and how
they causally interact with other things (including how they affect our sensory experiences of
the world). Even more crudely, they maintain that physical theories provide a purely formal
and mathematical description of the parts and mechanical workings of the cosmos.
These philosophers and scientists argue that there is more to physical reality than can be
gleaned from physical theories alone. This is because the physical universe is not itself
abstract and includes entities and forces that cannot be specified only and entirely in terms
of their space-time locations and how they are apt to behave in various circumstances. From
their point of view, such a picture of reality is far too insubstantial. Instead, the universe
consists of concrete natural phenomena with substantial underlying natures that physical
theories partially describe in terms of abstract mathematical measurements and equations. In
his 1988 A Brief History of Time, renowned British physicist and cosmologist Stephen
Hawking (1942–) expresses something like this point as follows: “Even if there is only one
possible unified theory [of physics], it is just a set of rules and equations. What is it that
breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?” (1988, 174).
Many of these philosophers and scientists also maintain that the concrete underlying natures
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of physical phenomena ultimately account for why they behave in accordance with the
abstract mathematical descriptions of physical theories. Unfortunately, they argue, physical
theories leave inscrutable (that is, unknown and unknowable) the underlying nature of the
physical phenomena they describe.
One can make this position more intuitive by considering a more familiar case: the kind
of understanding physical science gives us about black holes. Simply put, a black hole is a
mathematically describable region in space-time produced when a massive star collapses and
results in a core of matter so dense that its gravitational field does not permit electromagnetic
radiation to escape. Because no electromagnetic radiation can escape the extreme gravity of a
black hole (including visible light, ultraviolet light, X-rays, and so on), it is impossible for
scientists to observe them directly. Nevertheless, scientists can infer the existence of black holes
from their tremendous effects on nearby stellar matter, gases, and electromagnetic radiation.
From these indirect measures, scientists have been able to infer the size and locations of many
black holes and can describe with great detail and mathematical precision many of their
physical properties as well as much of their internal structure. Despite the incredible
explanatory power of our best scientific theories of black holes, however, we remain deeply
ignorant (and seemingly necessarily so) about what they are really like “from the inside.”
Philosophers and scientists who hold Russell’s view of physical theories take it that all
(or at least most) of our scientific knowledge about the natural world is analogous to our
knowledge of black holes. Many accept the view that our perceptual experience of the world
provides us with only indirect evidence of what physical entities are like based on how they
affect our sensory faculties in various conditions. Others claim that while perceptual
experience provides us with direct knowledge of some aspects of ordinary physical entities in
our environment, it does not disclose their full natures to us. In either case, they insist that
we are inexorably closed off from achieving a substantial understanding of what most
physical entities (whether microscopic or macroscopic) are really and fully like beyond the
abstract descriptions of their structure and workings provided by physical theory. The same
is true of physical properties such as mass and charge: ultimately, we grasp them only in
terms of how physical entities that possess them are apt to affect other physical entities and
our perceptual experiences in various circumstances. Otherwise, we are left completely in
the dark about what they, or any other physical phenomena, are really like “from the
inside.”
Of course, many of the assumptions made by those who endorse the view that the
natural world outstrips the structural descriptions of physical theory are controversial. For
one thing, many reject theories of perception according to which we have only indirect
evidence of what physical objects are like or according to which the full natures of such
objects are hidden from us (see the “Perception” chapter). As such, they would deny that
our knowledge of the familiar parts of physical reality is in any way analogous to our
knowledge of black holes or other physical entities we cannot directly observe. For another,
many reject the assumption that physical theories are, by their nature, limited to describing
physical phenomena in wholly abstract and structural terms. Finally, there are a number
who reject the claim that there is anything more to the natural world than its physical
structure.
For those who accept structuralism about physical theories and hold that the natural
world has an underlying nature that (at least at present) lies outside the scope of our
knowledge, the question of this scientifically inscrutable nature emerges. Moreover, it is
natural to consider whether this underlying nature is in some way relevant to the problem of
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integration. After all, if there is indeed more to the natural world than can be fully and
adequately described by physical theories, then we could simply chalk up our inability to
find a place in the natural order for consciousness to our ignorance rather than to any deep
divide in reality. Among other things, this opens the possibility that the hidden nature of
physical reality is consciousness itself, the nonconscious building blocks of consciousness, or
building blocks that are neither physical nor mental but which give rise to both. The
following sections examine each of these surprising possibilities.
MIND-DUST
In a 2014 article in Scientific American Mind, Christof Koch (1956–), a leading pioneer in
the neuroscience of consciousness, declared that “as a natural scientist, I find a version of
panpsychism modified for the 21st century to be the single most elegant and parsimonious
explanation of the universe I find myself in” (26). Taken strictly, panpsychism is the view
that everything (pan) in the universe, whether on the smallest or grandest scale, is a mind or
has some mental aspect (psyche). Yet most self-avowed panpsychists hold weaker views than
this. As such, panpsychism is perhaps better characterized as the view that minds or mind-
like qualities are a pervasive feature at the most basic or fundamental level of the cosmos. In
other words, it is typically expressed as the view that at least some of the most basic physical
entities and/or forces possess mental aspects of a primordial and elemental kind, which for
ease we could call microconsciousness. In this view, the sophisticated conscious mental lives of
the sort we and other sentient animals enjoy result from complex arrangements of and
interactions between vast numbers of fundamental physical entities exhibiting such
microconsciousness. Of course, one might reasonably wonder, why should anyone take such
a wild and fanciful proposal seriously? In point of fact, philosophers and scientists have
advanced a number of different arguments in support of panpsychism, some of which we
will survey in the following sections.
THE ARGUMENT FROM SIMPLICITY
As mentioned by Koch, one straightforward argument for panpsychism is that it provides
the simplest and most parsimonious picture of reality. Whereas most answers to the
problem of integration hold that there are both minds and physical entities that lack
mentality altogether, panpsychism maintains that the most basic physical entities and forces
are in some sense minded—that all energy, for instance, is consciousness. But then
Occam’s razor (“entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity”) suggests that, all other
things being equal, we should favor panpsychism over alternatives that commit us to the
existence of wholly nonmental entities. We can call this the argument from simplicity for
panpsychism.
The main worry about this argument is that appeals to parsimony carry only so much
weight. For one thing, we must pay heed to the qualification “all things being equal.” It is
rarely, if ever, the case that any two theories are truly equal in all respects except concerning
parsimony. As such, panpsychism’s (alleged) advantage in terms of ontological austerity has
to be weighed against any advantages its alternatives might have in their favor. For another
thing, while the dictate not to multiply entities “beyond necessity” is often a useful heuristic,
what we are ultimately after is a theory that adequately accounts for what there is in the
universe. For this reason, some have countered that we have equally good reason to accept
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the principle that theories must not commit us to fewer entities than are needed (Chatton
1321–1323; Kant [1781] 1998). They argue that our guiding dictate for the adoption of
theories really ought to be that we must not posit more or fewer entities than there in fact
are. In this view, a theory cannot be adequate if it posits complexity where there is really
simplicity or simplicity where there is really complexity. So the mere fact that panpsychism
is not committed to the existence of entities that are fundamentally nonmental is weak
evidence, at best, for its truth.
THE ARGUMENT AGAINST MYSTERIOUS NATURES
A number of panpsychists, including the British philosopher and literary critic Galen
Strawson (1952–), have retorted that our evidence for the existence of wholly insentient
entities is, in point of fact, more precarious than the evidence for microconsciousness
(Strawson 2016). After all, they contend, the only part of reality regarding which we have
any substantial knowledge of what it is like “from the inside” includes our own conscious
mental lives. Once matters are looked at in this way, they insist, panpsychism is more
modest than its alternatives, because it takes reality to be of a kind with the only part of
reality whose underlying nature we grasp. We can call this the argument against mysterious
natures for panpsychism.
Critics of panpsychism have responded to this challenge in a number of ways. As noted
earlier, many deny that there is extrastructural reality with an underlying nature of which we
are deeply ignorant. Others have noted that if we really are deeply ignorant of the
underlying nature of most of the physical world, this very fact makes it equally immodest for
us to attribute, without further argument, microconsciousness to basic physical entities as it
would be to attribute a nonmental nature to them. Thus, if we are to avoid complete
agnosticism about the nonstructural nature of reality, it must be on the basis of
considerations other than our limited knowledge of it.
THE INTEGRATED INFORMATION THEORY
Panpsychists have offered a number of arguments that aim to show that the existence of
microconsciousness is, in fact, the best explanation of what we know about the natural
world. For instance, Koch and several other prominent neuroscientists have suggested that
panpsychism is a consequence of our current best theory of how our brains generate highly
differentiated, informationally rich, and highly unified conscious experience: the integrated
information theory of consciousness. First proposed by Italian psychiatrist and
neuroscientist Giulio Tononi, this theory maintains that (1) conscious experience is
identical to the integrated information in a system and (2) its degree of complexity is a
function of how integrated this information is (which can be measured with a precise
mathematical formula). In this view, the richness of our conscious mental life results from
the complex way in which our brain’s thalamocortical system is organized—it exhibits both
a high degree of functional specialization by different groups of neurons and a high degree of
informational integration among them through a vast network of neural connections
(Tononi 2007, 293–294).
One surprising consequence of this view is that any system that exhibits a nonzero
amount of integrated information will have some degree of consciousness, however simple it
might be. This implies that other complex biological organisms are conscious, as are simple
unicellular organisms, the individual cells that make up plants and animals, artificial systems
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such as the Internet and neural networks, and perhaps even entangled systems of quantum
particles, among other possibilities.
The main problem with this argument is that our understanding of the biological basis of
consciousness remains relatively poor and many competing theories might turn out to be
correct. On some of these theories, such as British neurobiologist Semir Zeki’s (1940–)
“theory of micro-consciousness,” conscious experience requires little or no informational
integration. On others, the presence of a high degree of informational integration is not, by
itself, enough for conscious experience. As evidence for this, one might point to cases of
“blindsight” in which subjects, owing to lesions in their primary visual cortex, lack conscious
awareness in part of their visual field despite being able to react to the presence of stimuli there in
ways approximating normal conscious vision (Weiskrantz 2007). Such individuals can, for
instance, discriminate, classify, and react in complex ways to objects presented in the blind spot
in their visual field at levels well above chance—tasks that seemingly require some degree of
informational integration. There is even evidence that they can be subject to visual illusions in
their blind spots (Azzopardi and Hock 2011). Hence, whether the available empirical evidence
supports the integrated information theory of consciousness remains an open question.
THE CONTINUITY ARGUMENT
A more general empirical argument for panpsychism is the continuity argument, which
appeals to the high degree of continuity we observe in the natural world. In the past two
centuries, evolutionary biologists have amassed staggering evidence that the immense
diversity and complexity of life on the earth is the result of a long continuous process of
heritability and descent that ultimately can be traced back to ancient self-replicating
unicellular organisms. Along these lines of descent (as well as among currently living
organisms of varying complexity), scientists have discovered remarkable continuity in the
neuroanatomy, physiology, biochemistry, and goal-directed ecologically shaped behavior of
living organisms of diverse kinds. Though it is undeniable that this process results in varied
organisms with distinctive features, the emergence of such biological novelty is typically
gradual and (arguably) a matter of small modifications of preexisting materials (Clifford
1874; Seager and Allen-Hermanson 2015). Some have concluded from this that there is no
determinate point in the evolutionary development of complex organisms from simpler ones
where conscious mental lives plausibly first came onto the scene. Rather, they contend,
complex minds like ours have emerged gradually from those of more primitive organisms,
seemingly going all the way back to the rudimentary minds of the earliest forms of life.
Similar considerations can be used to call into question whether there is a sharp
boundary between living organisms and inanimate matter. For one thing, the predominant
view within the natural sciences is that life itself emerged gradually from more basic
nonliving chemical building blocks (a process called “abiogenesis”). For another, many
similarities exist in the behaviors of inorganic systems and those characteristic of simple
organisms. For instance, some note that quantum particles exhibit spontaneous activity that
is not fixed by antecedent conditions and informational coordination among mutually
entangled particles over any distance (Lockwood 1989; Seager and Allen-Hermanson 2015).
Evidence also suggests that complex nonliving systems, like living organisms, can replicate
themselves, spontaneously self-organize, and adapt to their environments to better dissipate
energy (England 2013). Some see these and other findings as strong evidence for unbroken
continuity between complex conscious organisms and events happening at the microphysi-
cal level of reality.
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Still, it is unclear that either the random behavior of quantum particles or the
covariation of discontinuous parts of an entangled quantum system is sufficiently analogous
to the activities of living organisms to support the claim of mental continuity. Moreover, the
fact that life seemingly emerged from nonlife can just as well be taken as evidence that there
was, in fact, some determinate point in the natural history of the universe when conditions
were suitable for consciousness to first come into existence. In any case, it is questionable
whether establishing unbroken continuity in the natural world with respect to life and
nonlife provides sufficient evidence for mental continuity as well. In light of these kinds of
issues, many panpsychists have sought defenses of their position that do not rest on specific
empirical details that might be overturned and/or admit of competing interpretations.
THE ARGUMENT AGAINST RADICAL EMERGENCE
It can be said that the most important argument of this sort is the argument against radical
emergence for panpsychism. One common presentation of it rests on the following three
claims: (1) our conscious mental lives emerge from more basic elements of the natural
world, (2) no radical emergence of novel features exists in nature, and (3) the emergence of
our conscious mental lives from entirely insentient materials would be a case of radical
emergence. Taken together, these three theses entail that our minds must emerge, in some
continuous fashion, from more basic materials that are themselves loci of sentience.
The first two claims enjoy wide (but not universal) acceptance among philosophers.
Most accept that complex minds are not part of the basic furniture of the world but rather
are composed of or in some way derive from the right kinds of arrangements of more basic
natural elements. Most also hold that whenever complex or novel phenomena emerge from
more basic natural elements, the emerging phenomena’s existence and features must flow
entirely from the nature and arrangement of that from which they emerge (even if our
ignorance precludes us from seeing how). Put simply, they reject the possibility of radical
and inexplicable “jumps” in nature. Hence, most of the disputes about this argument center
on the claim that the emergence of conscious minds from insentient materials would be a
problematic case of radical emergence.
Whereas the core conviction of physicalism (and a guiding assumption in the biological
and cognitive sciences) is that somehow our conscious mental lives are wholly grounded in
and determined by complex arrangements of more basic nonmental elements, panpsychists
see this as unintelligible. In particular, they agree with dualists that the subjective and
qualitative aspects of conscious experience cannot be accounted for in terms of more basic
elements that, by their very natures, entirely lack these features. By their lights, such
emergence would be just as miraculous and inexplicable as it would be for the addition of
two positive numbers to result in a negative number (Strawson 2006). Thus faced with the
(allegedly) insurmountable divide between the sentient and the insentient, panpsychists
conclude that complex mental lives such as ours must emerge in a continuous and
intelligible way (even if not for us) from more basic natural elements that are themselves
minded or that exhibit mind-like qualities.
Opponents respond to this challenge in various ways. Many insist that the biological
and cognitive sciences already provide us with a rough picture (and some of the finer details)
of how minds emerge nonradically from insentient materials. Others are willing to grant
that we have little idea of how consciousness arises within the physical domain while at the
same time denying that our state of ignorance has any implications for whether it is, in fact,
possible for it to do so. In either case, they reject the claim that, as a purely conceptual
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matter, the emergence of conscious experience from wholly nonexperiential elements is
unintelligible. Rather, they insist that the question of whether such emergence is or is not
possible must be answered, at least in part, through empirical investigation.
THE COMBINATION PROBLEM
In any case, panpsychism faces its own formidable challenge when it comes to the
emergence of complex minds from the right kinds of interactions among multitudes of
entities exhibiting microconsciousness. Simply put, there is the genuine question of how any
combination of more basic minds or mind-like qualities could somehow add up to
conscious mental lives like ours. This combination problem for panpsychism was famously
advanced by the American philosopher and psychologist William James (1842–1910) in his
groundbreaking 1890 The Principles of Psychology:
Where the elemental units [which compose complex minds] are supposed to be
feelings, the case is in no wise altered. Take a hundred of them, shuffle them and
pack them as close together as you can (whatever that may mean); still each remains
the same feeling it always was, shut in its own skin, windowless, ignorant of what the
other feelings are and mean. There would be a hundred-and-first feeling there, if,
when a group or series of such feelings were set up, a consciousness belonging to the
group as such should emerge… but they would have no substantial identity with it,
nor it with them, and one could never deduce the one from the others, or (in any
intelligible sense) say that they evolved it.… Private minds do not agglomerate into a
higher compound mind. (1950, 160)
James’s objection to panpsychism (or what he calls the “mind-dust” theory) here is that it is
no more intelligible to us how any number of simple subjects of experience could combine
to produce a new complex subject of experience than it is for a combination of insentient
materials to do so. Nor, many have noted, do we have an intelligible picture of how the
qualitative aspects of microexperiences could combine so as to yield the rich and varied
macroexperiences of the sort we and other sentient organisms enjoy. Consequently, the
emergence of our conscious mental lives from more basic natural elements (arguably) looks
to be just as miraculous and inexplicable for panpsychism as it is for competing views.
Most panpsychists agree that the combination problem is one of the most pressing
challenges to their view. Even so, they insist that the emergence of macro-level conscious
mental lives from micro-level elements exhibiting subjectivity and qualitativity does not, as a
conceptual matter, exhibit the same kind or degree of unintelligibility as does their
emergence from entirely insentient materials. Some have even offered proposals for solving
the combination problem for panpsychism (Goff 2016; Seager 2010; Shani 2010). It is fair
to say, however, that there remain real questions about whether any such proposal will be
successful. In the eyes of most contemporary philosophers of mind, panpsychism remains a
radical and extravagant answer to the problem of integration.
THE UNKNOWN ALCHEMY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
In recent years, a number of philosophers have endorsed panprotopsychism as a more
promising, and less radical, answer to the problem of integration. Panprotopsychism is the
doctrine that the fundamental entities described in abstract and structural terms by our
physical theories possess unknown underlying natures that, while not mental themselves,
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ultimately give rise to the conscious mental lives of complex creatures like us. Like
panpsychism, this view maintains that the best way to find a place for minds in nature is to
expand our conception of the world described by physical science. Unlike panpsychism, this
view respects our ordinary, scientifically informed belief that minds are rare occurrences in
nature that are not to be found on the smallest or grandest scales.
RUSSELL ON MIND AND MATTER
The chief historical inspiration for panprotopsychism is Bertrand Russell’s writings on
neutral monism in the early to middle part of the twentieth century. Pointing to
revolutionary developments in twentieth-century physics and psychology, Russell argued
that the traditional distinction between “mind” and “matter” is unfounded and that the
subject matter of both physics and psychology concerns collections of causally ordered
events in space-time. Some of these events, ones occurring in the brains of complex creatures
like us, are the mental episodes that we are directly aware of in having conscious experience.
These very same events can also be described in abstract structural terms by physics and
neuroscience. Regarding the rest of the (extracranial) events in nature, Russell maintained
that our knowledge of them is indirect and limited entirely to the abstract structural
descriptions provided by the various physical sciences.
While Russell acknowledged that our limited knowledge of the underlying nature of
most of the world opens the possibility that it is mental or mind-like, he cautioned that such
a conclusion is unwarranted by the evidence. On the contrary, he argued that the radical
differences in behavior between minded creatures and the rest of the natural world give us
stronger (though defeasible) grounds for thinking that its hidden nature is not mental or
mind-like. At the same time, he insisted that the events that make up our conscious mental
lives and those that make up the rest of nonmental physical reality are not entirely
discontinuous in character and so there is no unbridgeable divide between “mind” and
“matter.” Indeed, Russell claimed that the most reasonable hypothesis is that minds are
wholly constructed from the same nonmental events that make up the rest of physical
reality.
THE DUAL-ASPECT THEORY OF INFORMATION
Much of the recent interest in panprotopsychism (as well as the name itself) is due to the
work of Australian philosopher and cognitive scientist David Chalmers (1966–). In his
influential 1996 book The Conscious Mind, Chalmers presented (though stopped short of
fully embracing) panprotopsychism as follows:
The strategy to which I am most drawn stems from the observation that physical
theory only characterizes its basic entities relationally, in terms of their causal and
other relations to other entities. Basic particles, for instance, are largely characterized
in terms of their propensity to interact with other particles.… The picture of the
physical world that this yields is that of a giant causal flux, but the picture tells us
nothing about what all this causation relates.… [One possibility] is that the relevant
properties are protophenomenal properties. In this case the mere instantiation of
such a property does not entail experience, but instantiation of numerous such
properties could do so jointly. (153–154)
Chalmers readily admits that he can only speculate about how protophenomenal properties
might combine to jointly give rise to conscious mental lives like ours. Still, he insists that we
should take such a proposal seriously, given both its promise in providing an elegant
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solution to the problem of integration and our ignorance of the underlying nature of
physical reality.
One intriguing possibility Chalmers considers is whether panprotopsychism could be
successfully worked out within a “dual-aspect theory of information.” According to this
theory, information is a fundamental aspect of the physical universe, and the laws of physics
describe patterns in the transitions of its informational states “without actually saying what
those states are” (1996, 366). If this were true, Chalmers suggests, it would be natural to
suppose that the underlying natures of these dynamical informational states are phenomenal
or protophenomenal properties. Put in slogan form, his proposal is that “experience [or
protoexperience] is information from the inside; physics is information from the outside”
(305). While it is fair to say that Chalmers’s dual-aspect theory of information has not
achieved wide acceptance, it has convinced some that it is at least possible to make progress
toward a detailed, scientifically respectable version of panprotopsychism.
HIDDENNESS AND REVELATION
Despite its promise, panprotopsychism faces a number of challenges. To begin with, many
are hesitant to embrace any view according to which the natural world has an inscrutable
underlying nature—even when this hidden nature is not presumed to be mental or mind-
like in character. They argue that panprotopsychism trades the hard, but potentially solvable
problem of integration for an unsatisfying view according to which physical reality has
unknown and seemingly unknowable aspects. In response, proponents of panprotopsychism
point out, it would be presumptuous of us to assume that our cognitive capacities are up to
the task of achieving a comprehensive understanding of the nature of the universe.
Furthermore, some entertain the possibility that revolutionary developments in science
could eventually allow us to understand the hidden nature of physical reality.
Coming from the other direction, some have questioned whether panprotopsychism is
compatible with our intimate knowledge of our conscious mental lives. While there is a
great deal of ongoing controversy concerning the nature, scope, and limits of introspective
knowledge, many believe that our grasp of current conscious mental episodes is especially
secure and substantial. Some even suggest that our relation to our conscious experiences is so
intimate that their essential nature is fully presented or revealed to us whenever we have (and
attend to) them. If this is right, there is a problem for panprotopsychism because
introspection by itself does not give us any evidence that our conscious mental episodes
result from or are composed of more basic elements with insentient hidden natures. We can
call this the revelation argument against panprotopsychism.
Proponents of panprotopsychism can resist this argument in at least two ways. First,
they can reject the claim that facts about the composition and/or underlying basis of
conscious mental events are included in their essential natures (Chalmers 2016). Such a
denial would be particularly (but not only) plausible if particular kinds of conscious mental
events can be realized by more than one combination of more basic elements. Second, they
can deny that our introspective grasp of our conscious mental lives fully reveals to us their
essential natures. While many panprotopsychists find this to be an unappealing option,
others think we have good reason to doubt that our introspective knowledge of
consciousness is fully transparent and reliable even under optimal conditions (Russell
1948; Feigl 1975). This has long been one of the more hotly contested issues in philosophy
of mind, and it is beyond the scope of this chapter to survey the various considerations and
arguments on each side of the debate.
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RETURN OF THE COMBINATION PROBLEM
Perhaps the biggest challenge for panprotopsychism, however, is its own version of the
combination problem: How can the right complex arrangements of natural elements with
insentient hidden natures add up to subjects with conscious mental lives like our own? In
his 2016 “The Combination Problem for Panpsychism,” Chalmers usefully breaks down the
combination problem into at least three subproblems. First, there is the subject combination
problem, which concerns how complex arrangements of insentient materials could result in a
subject capable of having a first-person perspective on both the world and their own
conscious mental life. Second, there is the quality combination problem, which concerns how
complex arrangements of insentient materials could produce episodes with qualitative
dimensions such that there is something it is like, experientially speaking, for a subject to
live through them. Third, there is the structural combination problem (sometimes called the
“grain problem”), which concerns how complex arrangements of vast numbers of discrete,
spatially discontinuous insentient materials could yield conscious mental lives that are
unified, multifaceted, and structured both egocentrically and in terms of objects represented
as being in the environment. Each of these subproblems poses a daunting challenge for
panprotopsychism, and it is uncertain that any single proposal can answer all three, if they
can be answered at all.
Panprotopsychists respond to the subject combination problem in various ways. Some
attempt to explain the existence of subjects of experience (and subjective awareness
relations) in broadly functionalist terms—that is, in terms of a complex physical system
having the right kind of access to the qualities of its own internal states and processes (see
the “Functionalism” chapter). Others question whether there really are, in fact, such entities
as subjects of experience or subjective awareness relations. In this view (which we will
consider again later), our ordinary belief that we have a continuing “self” or “ego” distinct
from our flux of causally connected thoughts and experiences is nothing more than a useful
fiction. However, each of these proposals is controversial and raises issues beyond the scope
of this chapter (see “The Self” chapter).
When it comes to the quality combination problem, the standard strategy is to argue that
the fundamental physical entities and forces have hidden qualitative, but insentient natures,
which give rise to the familiar qualitative aspects of experience when combined in the right
way. However, by hypothesis we have no grasp of what these “microqualities” are really like
and so have no conception of how they might combine so as to yield the qualities of our
conscious experiences. Nor do we have any idea how diverse these microqualities might be.
Perhaps there are only a few kinds that, in various combinations, mysteriously yield the rich
variety of experiences we and other sentient beings enjoy. Given our deep ignorance of these
matters, however, we also cannot rule out that there is great diversity among them. Thus, it is
fair to say that it is entirely unclear, in our current state of understanding, whether or not
panprotopsychists can make real progress toward solving these problems.
When it comes to the structural combination problem, the situation is only slightly
more promising. The difficulty is in explaining how the right kinds of combinations of
discrete microphysical entities and forces with hidden insentient natures can give rise to
conscious mental lives structured in the ways ours are—ones with synchronic and
diachronic cohesion, which present us with a manifold of unified objects and events
standing in various egocentric relations to us and which exhibit smooth, continuous
qualities in various sensory and nonsensory modalities (each with its own distinctive
“quality space”).
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Panprotopsychists respond to this challenge in a number of different ways. One
common suggestion is that the apparent differences between the structure of conscious
experience and the structure the physical sciences attribute to the brain are merely the result
of our being aware of the same complex physical system in two very different ways (Russell
1948; Lockwood 1993). Others have entertained the possibility of identifying consciousness
with fluctuations in the right kinds of energy fields in the brain—ones generated by complex
neurophysiological activity—on the ground that fields could have structures isomorphic to
our conscious mental lives (Maxwell 1978). Still others have suggested that the structure we
are presented with in experience concerns how the world is represented as being, rather than
the experience’s own structure (Stoljar 2001). As with the other aspects of the combination
problem, there is little consensus on which, if any, of these strategies might ultimately be
successful.
NEUTRAL STUFF
The final view we consider in this chapter, neutral monism, once occupied a central position
in discussions of the problem of integration but has since fallen largely into obscurity.
Though it has been presented in many different guises, the core commitment of this
doctrine is that both physical and mental phenomena arise from a single kind of
fundamental reality (monism) which is, in and of itself, neither physical nor mental (neutral).
Among its most prominent proponents are Bertrand Russell, William James, and the
Austrian physicist, philosopher, and psychologist Ernst Mach (1838–1916), though
occasionally earlier well-known philosophers such as Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) and
David Hume (1711–1776) are also counted as neutral monists.
THE CASE FOR NEUTRAL MONISM
A number of motivations have persuaded thinkers to adopt neutral monism. The most
straightforward attraction is its promise to avoid positing two radically different kinds of
phenomena in the world while simultaneously skirting the long-standing (and, in their view,
insurmountable) problems of accounting for minds in terms of matter or matter in terms of
minds. Indeed, by positing that the fundamental nature of reality is in some sense neutral
between both mind and matter, the hope is to provide a simple and elegant framework that
narrows the gap for explaining each. Russell voices this sentiment as one guiding aim of his
1927 classic The Analysis of Matter:
To show that the traditional separation between physics and psychology, mind and
matter, is not metaphysically defensible will be one of the purposes of this work; but
the two will be brought together, not by subordinating either to the other, but by
displaying each as a logical structure composed of what, following Dr. H. M. Sheffer,
we shall call “neutral stuff.” (10)
Second, as Russell’s comments indicate, neutral monists also see their view as promising to
unify psychology and the physical sciences (without reducing or eliminating one in favor of
the other) by giving them a shared subject matter. We have seen this already in Russell’s
view that psychology describes the portion of reality we are directly aware of in experience
but which, at the same time, physics can abstractly describe in terms of its spatiotemporal
and causal structure. For this reason, he and other neutral monists have tended to think that
psychology, on one hand, and the physical sciences, on the other, are simply convenient
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tools for describing one and the same reality in different ways, depending on our
explanatory interests. In his 1886 The Analysis of Sensations and the Relation of the Physical to
the Psychical, Mach conveyed this position as follows:
[The] great gulf between physical and psychological research persists only when we
acquiesce in our habitual stereotyped conceptions [of “mind” and “matter”]. A color
is a physical object as soon as we consider its dependence, for instance, upon its
luminous source, upon other colors, upon temperatures, upon spaces, and so forth.
When we consider, however, its dependence upon the retina… it is a psychological
object, a sensation. Not the subject matter, but the direction of investigation, is
different in the two domains. (English translation, 1914, 17–18)
In fact, some neutral monists have entertained the possibility of our developing a new science—
one more fundamental than both physics and psychology—which would describe the neutral
stuff of the world directly, without any appeal to the antiquated and troublesome concepts of
“mind” and “matter.” In his 1935 Religion and Science, Russell described his version of an
imagined future science (which he elsewhere called “chrono-geography”) as one which “begins
with events having space-time relations and does not assume at the outset that certain strings of
them can be treated as persistent material units or as minds” ([1935] 1997, 294).
The third reason some are drawn to neutral monism is that it diminishes the need to
accept aspects of reality that they find dubious and/or mysterious. One notable example of
this is James’s and Russell’s skepticism, based on a lack of introspective evidence, concerning
the existence of any such entity as the “self” or “subject” of experience above and beyond the
psychological episodes making up a single stream of consciousness. On the same grounds,
they also questioned the idea that our immediate knowledge of our mental lives is a matter
of one thing, our self or ego, standing in an awareness relation to (or being presented with)
something else, our thoughts and experiences. By their lights, neutral monism provided a
way to avoid these problematic phenomena, and they adopted the view that what we think
of as our “self” or “mind” is simply a series of causally connected episodes whose qualities are
in some way self-presenting.
James and Mach (though not Russell) similarly hoped that neutral monism would
enable them to dispense with the idea that physical reality has hidden and unknowable
aspects by claiming that it is entirely of the same nature as the contents of immediate
experience. At the same time, because they held the contents of immediate experience to be
intrinsically neutral qualities, they did not thereby commit themselves to any kind of
idealism or panpsychism.
THE CASE AGAINST NEUTRAL MONISM
Few today are convinced that neutral monism offers a promising way to solve the problem
of integration. For one thing, the prevailing view is that neutral monism faces something of
a dilemma when trying to explain both the nature of the fundamental neutral elements and
in what sense they are genuinely neutral. On one hand, if the elements that make up the
natural world are taken to have qualitative natures of the exact same kind as the contents of
our immediate experience, then it becomes difficult to see why neutral monism would not
collapse into idealism or panpsychism (despite the protests of James or Mach). On the other
hand, if these elements are taken to have underlying qualitative natures that differ in some
important way from those familiar from our experience, then it becomes equally difficult to
see why it does not collapse into a version of panprotopsychism. Thus, many wonder
whether neutral monism is an entirely stable position.
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For another thing, neutral monism appears to face a particularly formidable challenge
when it comes to the combination problem. For not only must it explain how the right
combinations of neutral elements could somehow add up to the complex conscious mental
lives we and other sentient organisms enjoy, it must at the same time explain how different
combinations of these very same elements could result in the vast multitude of insentient
phenomena that make up the rest of the cosmos. Thus, while panpsychism and
panprotopsychism face a combination problem from only one direction (the mind), neutral
monism faces two combination problems from different directions (the mind and matter).
While a rare few remain unfazed by this challenge, it is fair to say that most philosophers
prefer less daunting avenues for solving the problem of integration.
Summary
In this chapter, we have examined some of the of the main arguments for and against three
philosophical views that hold that conscious minds, or their fundamental building blocks,
are pervasive features of the cosmos. The first is panpsychism, which is the doctrine that at
least some of the most basic elements that make up the natural world have minds or mind-
like qualities. The second is panprotopsychism, which is the doctrine that fundamental
physical entities, while not themselves minded, have unknown underlying natures that give
rise to conscious minds when they are arranged into a sufficiently complex physical system.
The third is neutral monism, which is the doctrine that both minds and matter are
constructed from more basic elements of reality that are, in themselves, neither mental nor
physical.
Like physicalism and functionalism, each of these views offers, in varying degrees, a
simple and elegant picture of where consciousness fits into the physical universe and its
(seemingly) all-encompassing causal order. All three accomplish this by embracing the view
that physical theories provide only an abstract and mathematical description of the causal
and spatiotemporal structure of the universe and leave us ignorant of its true underlying
nature. Still, if this interpretation of the physical theories is correct, then each of these views
is fully compatible with everything the physical sciences have to tell us about the cosmos.
At the same time, panpsychism, panprotopsychism, and neutral monism offer many of
the attractions of dualism. They each can happily accept that the abstract and structural
scientific descriptions of a sentient creature’s biology, history, functioning, or relations to its
environment cannot by themselves provide us with knowledge of the experiential
dimensions of the creature’s mental life. This is because such descriptions leave out the
underlying nature of physical reality, which, under the right conditions, results in the rich
conscious experiences of complex creatures like us. Similarly, each view can accept that we
can coherently imagine beings physically and functionally just like us whose conscious
mental lives differ from ours and vice versa, because when we conceive of physical reality,
we do so entirely in terms of its abstract structural features and not in terms of its underlying
nature. Still, they can insist, if we were in a position to fully grasp this hidden nature, we
would not be able to coherently imagine our conscious mental lives coming apart from it in
either of these ways.
As we have seen, however, each of these views has its own strengths and weaknesses.
Panpsychism gets its strongest support from its simplicity, its rejection of mysterious aspects
of reality, the high degree of continuity we observe in the natural world, and the intuition
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that the emergence of consciousness from wholly insentient materials would be a miraculous
and inexplicable “jump” in nature. However, each of these arguments is controversial, and
many still see panpsychism as overly extravagant and radically counterintuitive.
Panprotopsychism shares many of the virtues of panpsychism but accords much better
with our commonsense view that conscious minds are a relatively rare occurrence in the
history of the universe. However, one significant cost of panprotopsychism is that it
commits us to the view that physical entities have hidden natures that may differ in
unimaginable ways from how we experience them as being. The main promise of neutral
monism is that it will dissolve the troublesome distinction of “mind” and “matter” and
provide a unified subject matter for psychology and the natural sciences. It is hard to make
sense, however, of the idea of a neutral stuff that is neither mental nor physical but that
somehow gives rise to both. Indeed, the greatest challenge for all three of these views is the
combination problem. As things stand, we have no clear idea of how any basic conscious
elements, unknown insentient qualities, or intrinsically neutral elements could combine to
yield complex but unified mental lives like ours, with rich subjective and experiential
dimensions. So while these views are (arguably) exciting and fertile grounds for investigating
consciousness and its place in the natural world, many will continue to view them as overly
speculative and perhaps even fanciful unless and until they can make real progress on the
combination problem.
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